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I. INTRODUCTION 
 If someone asked you to explain how your email message got from the smart device in 
your hand to a recipient across the globe, would you know the answer?  Chances are you may 
think that it is the myriad satellites orbiting the earth that are responsible for your email 
communication from Point A to Point B.  If you thought this was the case, then you would not be 
alone.  There is a common misperception that the world’s communications data is transmitted by 
those satellites.  As one commentator noted, “the idea that a person’s cell phone link is sent to a 
nearby cell tower, but that the overseas messages themselves are then broken into bits of data, 
which then ply the ocean depths at the speed of light via unseen cables, is hard to imagine.”   In 1
reality, though, the world’s communications data is transmitted by these unseen cables.  Our data 
travels far below sea-level, along a series of underwater fiberoptic cables on the seabed 
connecting the earth’s continents.  In March of 2019, several mainstream newspapers had front 
page articles discussing the importance of this web of underwater fiberoptic cables that brought 
greater recognition to their importance.    2
 Douglas R. Burnett & Lionel Carter, International Submarine Cables and Biodiversity of Areas Beyond 1
National Jurisdiction: The Cloud Beneath the Sea, BRILL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES IN THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, 3 (2017). 
 See Jeremy Page, Kate O’Keefe, and Rob Taylor, U.S. Fights Huawei in Undersea Data Grid, WALL 2
STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 13, 2019, at A1 (discussing United States increasing its awareness of 
vulnerabilities to underwater fiberoptic cables); see also Adam Satariano, How the Internet Travels Across 
the Oceans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2019 (explaining how email is broken into bits and transferred to its 
recipient via underwater fiberoptic cables).  
 Experts estimate that 98% of international internet, data and telephone traffic is 
transmitted by this series of underwater fiberoptic cables.    In the past ten years, there has been 3
increased awareness of the vulnerabilities of underwater fiberoptic cables and, more relevant to 
proponents of international law, there has been increased dialogue regarding not just the 
international legal regime protecting them but the gaps in that regime as well.  There have been 
no less than four prominent scholarly articles highlighting the gaps in the international legal 
framework protecting underwater fiberoptic cables.  The articles recommend various solutions 
that would use international law to secure the vital underbelly of the world’s communications.  
These solutions vary from the creation of an international treaty to the United States ratification 
of the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to the collective revision of 
various treaties that were ratified decades ago.  These solutions, while certainly commendable, 
are not necessarily practical in the world that exists in 2019.  Instead, the United States should 
look at customary international law for solutions to the gaps in the international legal regime 
protecting underwater fiberoptic cables.  This paper presents a comprehensive strategy for the 
United States to establish customary international law to protect the fiberoptic cables beyond its 
territorial seas.   
 The first section of the paper will explore the history of underwater cables and briefly 
discuss the importance of these cables to the world.  The second section will present the current 
international legal framework, its gaps and the various solutions offered by scholars.  The third 
 Douglas R. Burnett, David Freestone & Tara Davenport, Submarine cables in the Sargasso Sea: legal 3
and environmental issues in areas beyond national jurisdiction, Report of a Workshop held in 




section will turn to customary international law and how it has been developed over the last 
century.  Lastly, this paper will present a comprehensive plan for the United States to establish 
customary international law to cover some of the current gaps in the international legal regime, 




 One has to understand the history of underwater cables to fully understand the 
international legal framework governing them and its current gaps.  This paper does not attempt 
to provide a comprehensive history of the subject.  Rather, it will briefly highlight the almost 170 
year history of telecommunications to provide context to the ensuing legal discussion.   The first 4
telegraph link was laid between Dover, England and Calais, France in 1850.   It failed almost 5
immediately because of an abrasion caused by the surrounding environment underwater.   A new 6
telegraph link was laid between the two locations a year later, but this time was enmeshed with 
steel; it worked for over a decade.   The first transatlantic underwater cable was laid between 7
Newfoundland and Ireland in June 1858 and transmitted over 400 messages before it broke after 
 See Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF 4
LAW AND POLICY, 19-39 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014) (providing a comprehensive review of the 
history of submarine cables). 
 Lionel Carter & Douglas R. Burnett, Subsea Telecommunications, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 5
OCEAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT, 349, 350 (Hance D. Smith, et al. eds., 2015). 
 Ash, supra note 4, at 21. 6
 Id. at 21-22. 7
 !3
26 days.   Six years later, in 1864, a new cable was successfully laid between Valentia, Ireland 8
and Hearts Content, Newfoundland.   Cables were then laid successfully throughout the globe, 9
including a cable connecting land masses along the seabed of the Pacific Ocean in 1902.    10
 As one historian noted, “advances in cable design and construction improved reliability 
and transmission speeds, which increased from twelve words per minute for the first cables to 
200 words per minute by the 1920s.”   The invention of the telephone created a new era in 11
telecommunications in the 1950s.  The underwater cable in the 1950s now carried signals by 
copper wire, allowing transcontinental voice communications between parties.   As scientific 12
research continued to advance, these cables advanced in capabilities to allow a single cable to 
carry multiple voice channels.  The first coaxial system, laid between Scotland and 
Newfoundland in 1956, called a “TAT-1,” allowed for 707 telephone calls on the first day 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.   Technological innovation allowed for 13
increased capacity of voice channels over the decades.  The last coaxial cable, the TAT-7, had the 
ability to carry up to 4,000 channels.    14
 The emergence of satellites, however, greatly reduced the need for underwater cables in 
the 1970s.   Satellites had more capacity and were more reliable, resulting in their dominance of 15
 Id. at 22; Carter and Burnett, supra note 5, at 350.8
 Ash, supra note 4, at 22. 9
 Id. 10
 Carter & Burnett, supra note 5, at 351. 11
 Stephen C. Drew & Alan G. Hopper, Fishing and Submarine Cables: Working Together, International 12
Cable Protection Committee (February 23, 2009) at 8, available at https://www.iscpc.org/publications/. 
 Carter & Burnett, supra note 5, at 351. 13
 Drew & Hopper, supra note 12, at 15. 14
 Id.15
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the telecommunications sphere through the 1980s.  This reliance on satellites during this 
timeframe, though decades ago, in small part, explains some of the misperception highlighted 
supra.   
 The discovery of fiberoptic cables shifted the focus back on underwater cables in the late 
1980s.  Fiberoptic cables could carry significantly more capacity than either the coaxial cables of 
the past or satellites.  The first transatlantic fiberoptic cable was laid in 1986.   Since then, 16
technological advances have increased the capacity of fiberoptic cables by a factor of 100,000 in 
25 years.   Fiberoptic cables are so much more efficient than satellites that one expert estimated 17
in 2007 that, if the then-roughly forty fiberoptic cables connecting the United States to the rest of 
the world were cut simultaneously, “only 7% of the total United States traffic volume could be 
carried by satellite.”   Thus, technological advancement brought underwater cables to an 18
extremely prominent role not just nationally for the United States, but globally as well.    
B. WAIT - IT’S THE SIZE OF A GARDEN HOSE?   
 An underwater fiberoptic cable is roughly the size of a garden hose.  Each fiberoptic 
cable contains a set of between 6 to 24 glass fibers at its core.   Each glass fiber is estimated to 19
be the width of a human hair.   These glass fibers are encased in a steel tube filled with a 20
 Carter & Burnett, supra note 5, at 351. 16
 Burnett & Carter, supra note 1, at 3. 17
 Id. at 4 (quoting statement of Douglas R. Burnett, International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), to 18
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Oct. 4, 2007). 
 Drew & Hopper, supra note 12, at 9. 19
 Id. 20
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thixotropic medium.   There is a layer of steel wire strands to provide strength, a “copper-band 21
composite conductor” that carries electrical power and a “protective insulating sheath of 
polyethylene” on the outside.   These layers help protect the cables from the harsh 22
environmental conditions of their surroundings on the seabed.  Each underwater fiberoptic cable 
has devices called “repeaters” at intervals along it to regenerate or strengthen signals sent at long 
distances.  23
 Communications are transmitted by a series of “lasers [that] shoot pulses of light through 
these glass fibers, generating tens of thousands of communications circuits.”   Computers at one 24
end of the communication convert sounds and data to “digital pulses,” and computers at the 
opposite end reconstruct these “digital pulses” back together.   Cable systems are not 25
inexpensive; rather, they represent significant multi-national cooperation and investment.  A 
Director of National Intelligence Report for the United States estimates that a single cable often 
represents over $1 billion dollars of investment.   A relatively tiny device, then, represents 26
significant global investment and, as the next section will show, significant global importance.  
 Carter & Burnett, supra note 5, at 350. 21
 Id. 22
 Drew & Hopper, supra note 12 at 9. 23
 Id.24
 Id.25
 Public-Private Analyst Exchange Program, Threats to Undersea Cable Communication, DEPT. OF 26
HOMELAND SECURITY ANALYST EXCHANGE PROGRAM, 11 (Sept 28, 2017), available at https://
www.dni.gov/files/PE/Documents/1---2017-AEP-Threats-to-Undersea-Cable-Communications.pdf. 
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C. GLOBAL IMPORTANCE 
 As of 2017, it was estimated that the global fiberoptic cable landscape encompassed 241 
active, separate and decentralized international cables that total roughly 1,046,138 km of 
submarine cables across the globe’s surface.   In December 2014, it was estimated that at least 27
55 in-service submarine cables landed in the United States, with at least 12 more fiberoptic 
cables planned for construction.   These cables do not land in disparate locations across the 28
American coastline; rather, they are clustered along patches in California, Florida, New Jersey, 
New York and Oregon.   Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the trans-Atlantic fiberoptic 29
cables have landing stations all within a 30-mile radius of New York City.   New fiberoptic 30
cables were simply layered on top of previous locations of past cables.   
 These fiberoptic cables are largely unseen by the average person using the internet daily.  
The ubiquity of the internet is, in part, what makes it difficult for the average human being to 
understand the physical aspect of it.  Indeed, the search for the physical infrastructure that 
supplied the internet led one writer on a search across the globe, culminating in the 2012 book 
Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet.  Its author, Andrew Blum, noted that “other than 
obscurity and a few feet of sand, [the underwater fiberoptic cables] are just there” when 
 Burnett & Carter, supra note 1, at 45 (citing to a WFN Subtel Forum database analysis reported to 27
Douglas Burnett in an email dated Jan. 4, 2017). 
 Working Group 8 Submarine Cable Routing & Landing, Final Report - Protection of Submarine Cables 28
Through Spatial Separation, THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, RELIABILITY & INTEROPERABILITY 
COUNCIL IV, 1.
 Robert Martinage, Under the Sea, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2015 Issue, available at 29
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-commons/under-sea.
 Michael Sechrist, New Threats, Old Technology - Vulnerabilities in Undersea Communication Cable 30




describing a fiberoptic cable landing on a beach.   Indeed, this author ventured to a cable 31
landing location in Lynn, Massachusetts to find a manhole clearly marking its existence in the 
middle of a rotary on a well traveled street near the town beach.  This particular fiberoptic cable 
was hiding in plain sight of any knowing observer.   While landing stations are not the subject 32
of this paper, it is relevant to note this description as it highlights many of the vulnerabilities of 
underwater fiberoptic cables.   
 The financial numbers that the internet, and thus this web of underwater fiberoptic cables, 
is responsible for each day are staggering.  In a report published in 2017, experts noted that the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) transmitted 15 million 
messages over cables to 8,300 banking organizations, securities institution and corporations in 
208 countries each day.   Similarly, that same report cited that the United States Clearing House 33
Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) estimated that $1 trillion American dollars was transmitted 
each day to over 22 countries.   Thus, when those cables are cut, the financial impact can be 34
devastating.  As the former Chief of Staff for the United States Federal Reserve Board once said, 
 Alexandra Chang, Why Undersea Internet Cables are more vulnerable than you think they are, 31
WIRED.COM, Apr. 2, 2013, available at https://www.wired.com/2013/04/how-vulnerable-are-undersea-
internet-cables/.
 The fiberoptic landing station in Lynn, Massachusetts is located at an obscure but secured facility 32
bearing the name GTT.  The cable lands at Nahant Beach, a quaint beach on the shore not two miles from 
the facility.  There are markings on the sidewalk alongside the beach denoting where the fiberoptic cable 
is located underneath (from the water to the facility), and the manhole is marked with the name of the first 
telecommunication company that laid the cable (360 Network).  See www.surfacing.in (providing 
interactive webpage for user to simulate a signal traveling along the undersea network to nearly all 
fiberoptic cable landing stations globally, including photos and explanations of how the cable industry 
works). 
 Burnett & Carter, supra note 1, at 4. 33
 Id. 34
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“when communication networks go down, the financial services sector does not grind to a halt, 
rather it snaps to a halt.”   35
 There are several recent examples of this devastating impact.  In January 2019, Tonga 
was without internet for over 11 days when the cable connecting its 170 islands to the rest of the 
world was cut by what was believed to have been a ship’s anchor.   International calls were 36
unavailable, as were credit card payments.   A local satellite internet provider offered some 37
connectivity, but “officials…block[ed] sites like Facebook and YouTube so that essential services 
could squeeze through.”   In another example in Southeast Asia, it took 11 ships almost 50 days 38
to complete repairs to undersea cables damaged from an underwater earthquake off the coast of 
Taiwan in 2006.   China, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam experienced 39
significant disruptions to their respective economies due to lost communication links.   In April 40
2018, Mauritania was without internet access for 48 hours when a cable from Europe to Africa, 
called the African Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine cable, was cut.   Ten additional countries 41
were impacted by the severed cable, preventing internet access to millions of individuals.    42
 Public-Private Analyst Exchange Program, Threats to Undersea Cable Communication, supra note 26, 35
at 6. 
 Daniel Victor, Could You Last 11 Days Without the Internet? Tonga Finds Out the Hard Way, N.Y. 36




 Martinage, supra note 26. 39
 Id. 40
 Chris Baynes, Entire Country Taken Offline for Two Days After Undersea Internet Cable Cut, UK 41




D. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO 
 While natural disasters or ships’ anchors have caused much of the destruction to 
underwater cables in the past, there is increasing concern regarding more nefarious actors.  One 
cut by an anchor will cause delay to internet traffic as it is re-routed via another fiberoptic cable; 
simultaneous cuts to several cables will have significantly more impact on a nation.  This paper 
is concerned with these nefarious actors.  For example, there has been significant concern in the 
past few years that the Russian government will sever fiberoptic cables as a precursor to a 
traditional kinetic military operation.   There is even Russian precedent for doing so.  As the 43
United Kingdom Member of Parliament (MP) Rishi Sunak noted in his Policy Exchange Report 
on Undersea Cables, “Russian special forces only had to secure one internet exchange point (at 
Simferopol)…[to] cut cable connections to the rest of Ukraine” in its annexation of Crimea in 
2014.   Russia “was able to control the flow of information” into Crimea, allowing it “to spread 44
disinformation aimed at portraying its actions as legitimate.”   In 2017, the United Kingdom’s 45
then-Defense Chief,  Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, warned that risks to its underwater 
cables presented a “new risk to our way of life” and that a severed cable to the island would have 
“potentially catastrophic” impact on its economy.   46
 See David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables are too close for U.S. Comfort, 43
NY TIMES, Oct. 25, 2015, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-
presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-
column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 (discussing American military concerns 
regarding Russian naval submarines patrolling close to the location of underwater fiberoptic cables). 
 Rishi Sunak MP, Undersea Cables: Indispensable, insecure, POLICY EXCHANGE, 32 (2017). 44
 Id. 45
 Arj Singh, Russia "could cut UK’s undersea internet cables," defence chief warns, THE INDEPENDENT, 46
Dec. 14, 2017, available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/russia-attack-uk-cables-
underwater-sea-protection-a8111536.html.
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 Further, it is not simply the Russians that can be seen as a threat to this critical 
underwater infrastructure.  In 2013, the Egyptian military arrested three men in scuba gear who 
allegedly attempted to cut an underwater fiberoptic cable off the coast of the Egyptian city of 
Alexandria.   This attempt is reported to have “caused a 60 percent drop in internet speeds.”   47 48
While no further details on the arrest have been reported, MP Sunak noted the incident 
“demonstrates…the low degree of sophistication required for determined individuals to cause 
serious disruption[s] to internet communications.”   In addition, the United Kingdom reportedly 49
foiled an attempt by Al-Qaeda to sever the United Kingdom’s internet access in 2007.   While 50
the planned attack was on the main server house of Telehouse Europe, and not underwater 
fiberoptic cables, the report nevertheless highlights that intentional damage to the physical 
infrastructure of the internet is a target of myriad nefarious actors.  The next section will analyze 
the international legal framework protecting the underwater fiberoptic cables.  
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 
A. THE 1884 CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF SUBMARINE TELEGRAPH CABLES 
 As noted above, understanding the history of underwater cables assists in understanding 
why the cables that carry so much of the world’s communications data in 2019 refer to a treaty 
that was established in the 19th century.  The importance of underwater cables was recognized 
very early in their history.  Cyrus Field, notable as the first trans-Atlantic cable proponent, stated 
 Chang, supra note 31.47
 Id. 48
 Sunak, supra note 43, at 24. 49
 James Rivington, UK foils terrorist plot to kill the internet, TECH RADAR, Mar. 12, 2007, available at 50
https://www.techradar.com/news/internet/web/uk-foils-terrorist-plot-to-kill-the-internet-132665.
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in 1866 that the “telegraph in the air and under the water should be regarded as a sacred thing, 
protected by unanimous consent against all attack or damage.”   The protection of underwater 51
cables was on the agenda of seven international conventions between 1863 and 1913.   The first 52
international treaty protecting underwater cables, the Convention for the Protection of Submarine 
Telegraph Cables (hereinafter “1884 Cable Convention”), was signed in Paris in 1884.   
 The 1884 Cable Convention “applies outside territorial waters to all legally established 
submarine cables landed” on the colonies or territory of the signing parties.   There are several 53
provisions in the convention that are relevant today.  First, it made damage, either intentional or 
through negligence, a punishable offense.   Second, it gave signatories the right to board vessels 54
when they “have reason to believe that an infraction of the measures provided for in the present 
Convention has been committed by a vessel other than a vessel of war.”   This is significant 55
because, as the first article of the treaty notes, the 1884 Cable Convention applies beyond 
territorial waters.  Yet while it only addressed submarine cables beyond territorial waters, it has 
been reported that “it was understood by the negotiators that coastal States would also have laws 
protecting submarine cables within their territorial waters.”   At the time of enactment, however, 56
 Douglas Burnett, Tara Davenport & Robert Beckman, Overview of the International Legal Regime 51
Governing Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 
4, at 65. 
 Id. 52
 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, art. 1, Mar. 14, 1884 [hereinafter 1884 53
Cable Convention].
 Id. at art. 2.  54
 Id. at art. 10. 55
 Submarine Cables - International Framework, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC 56
ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, https://www.gc.noaa.gov/
gcil_submarine_cables_international.html. 
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the width of territorial seas was not nearly as expansive as the twelve nautical miles that it 
measures today.    57
 The over-arching purpose of the 1884 Cable Convention was to require signatory states to 
adopt domestic legislation to protect submarine cables.   At Article XII, the signatories agreed to 
“take or to propose to their respective legislatures the necessary measures for insuring[sic] the 
execution of the present Convention, and especially for punishing, by fine or imprisonment, or 
both” those who violated the Conventions’ provisions.   This is implemented in the United 58
States with penalties for willful injury to a cable of “imprisonment for a term not exceeding two 
years, or to a fine not exceeding $5,000, or to both fine and imprisonment.”   This legislation, 59
first implemented in the 19th century, has not been updated since.  Needless to say, there has 
never been an arrest or prosecution under this section of the United States Code.  60
B. 1958 GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 As the world transformed from telegraph to telephone, underwater cables were still 
vitally important.  Thus, when the newly formed United Nations tasked the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to codify the law of the sea in 1950s, underwater cables were a topic on its 
agenda.  The ILC struggled with whether to codify all aspects of maritime law, even if it was 
 See George Grafton Wilson, The Law of Territorial Waters, 23 AM. J. INT’L. L. 2, 241-380 (Apr 1929) 57
(detailing history and commentary of the law of territorial waters up until 1929, noting that most coastal 
states claimed 3 nautical miles but others varied). 
 1884 Cable Convention, supra note 53, at art. 12.58
 47 U.S.C. § 21 (2012). 59
 Eric Wagner, Submarine cables and protections provided by the law of the sea, 19 MARINE POLICY 2, 60
127, 135 (Mar. 1995). 
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governed by another treaty such as the 1884 Cable Convention.   In the end, three provisions of 61
the 1884 Cable Convention were incorporated in the ILC Draft Articles: Article II (making 
intentional or negligent damage to cables a punishable offense), Article IV (indemnification of 
the owner of a cable by the owner of another cable company who damaged the cable) and Article 
V (indemnification for cable owners who lost equipment in an attempt to avoid damage to a 
cable).   These provisions were considered “essential principles on the law of the sea” and thus 62
necessary to include in the ILC Draft Articles.   Only Article II - making intentional or negligent 63
damage to cables a punishable offense - related to the criminalization of damage of the cables.  
The inclusion of Article IV and Article V illuminate the concerns of the time that the majority of 
damage would be caused by other cable laying companies.  The ILC Draft Articles also, for the 
first time, included the right of each nation to lay underwater cables.  64
 The first Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in 1958, at which the ILC Draft 
Articles were used as a negotiating text.  The three provisions recommended by the ILC were 
adopted in the resulting 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas.  Interestingly, the United States initially protested the adoption of just three 
provisions of the 1884 Cable Convention for fear that it “would undermine its effectiveness.”   65
President Dwight D. Eisenhower noted as much when he transmitted the documents to the 
Senate for its advice and consent.  In the commentary submitted to the Senate, the administration 
 Burnett, Davenport & Beckman, supra note 51, at 70. 61
 Id. at 71. 62
 Id. 63
 Id. 64
 Id. at 72. 65
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noted that it initially urged restraint from including submarine cables in the document “in view of 
the existing conventions on the subject…but withdrew its objection on the understanding that 
existing conventions or other international agreements already in force would not be affected.”   66
Thus, in order for the United States to sign and ratify the 1958 treaties, it was agreed that no 
provisions in the 1958 treaties would impact the 1884 Cable Convention.  67
C. 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 The United Nations held a third conference on the law of the sea in 1973, culminating 
nine years later in the 1982 UNCLOS.  Three articles specific to the protection of underwater 
cables were included in the final draft.  Article 113 requires states to adopt domestic legislation 
to prosecute individuals that intentionally or negligently damage submarine cables.   This 68
article, however, makes clear that prosecution is limited to “a ship flying its flag or by a person 
subject to its jurisdiction.”   Article 114 requires states to adopt domestic legislation providing 69
for the indemnification of a cable company that causes damage to another cable in the process of 
laying or repairing a cable.   Finally, Article 115 requires states to adopt domestic legislation 70
 Four Conventions & an Optional Protocol Formulated at the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 66
Message from the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower to the 86th Congress, 1st 
Session, on Sept. 9, 1959, Ex. Doc. J-N, 86-1,-2. 
 Burnett, Davenport & Beckman, supra note 51, at 73.  See Convention of the High Sea, Apr. 29 1958, 67
450 U.N.T.S. 11 (codifying this provision at Article 30, excerpted here: “The provisions of this 
Convention shall not affect conventions or other international agreements already in force, as between 
States Parties to them.”)
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 113, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 68
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 Id. 69
 Id. at art. 114. 70
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providing for indemnification for owners of ships that incur costs in the avoidance of damaging 
cables.    71
 These provisions were nearly exact duplicates of the ILC Draft Articles that had been 
approved in the 1958 Conventions.  Again, recognizing the history of underwater cables is 
important in light of the timing of UNCLOS.  In the 1970s and 1980s, satellites were the 
dominant provider of telecommunications data.  Thus, while submarine cables were important 
enough to be included in UNCLOS, very little debate was had regarding the relevant provisions.  
The first fiberoptic cable was not invented until after UNCLOS concluded and, as noted supra, 
the first underwater fiberoptic cable was not laid until 1986.  Thus, while UNCLOS is one of the 
foundational documents for the international legal regime governing underwater fiberoptic 
cables, neither it, nor its predecessor documents in 1958 or 1884, for that matter, could ever have 
anticipated the importance that underwater fiberoptic cables would have to the global economy.  
 One aspect of UNCLOS that is relevant to note for purposes of this discussion is that one 
of its most important aspects is its emphasis on flag state jurisdiction.  As one commentator 
noted, “it was necessary to clarify that a State could not take legislative measures against 
nationals of another State, only against its own ships or nationals.”   This paper will explore the 72
gaps in the international legal framework now that the foundation for the protection of 
underwater fiberoptic cables has been laid. 
 Id. at art. 115. 71
 Myron H. Nordquist, Satya N. Nandan & James Kraska, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW 72
OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 268 (Center for Oceans Law and Policy, 2012). 
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D. GAPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 There have been several law review articles, policy papers and blog posts in the past ten 
years that have drawn attention to the gaps in the international legal framework regarding the 
protection of underwater fiberoptic cables.  Most, if not all, of these sources highlight the same 
four gaping holes in the current international law regime.   
 First, while coastal nations have the right, under UNCLOS, to adopt laws and regulations 
relating to innocent passage through their respective territorial seas to protect cables and 
pipelines, there is no obligation to do so.   Article 113 of UNCLOS, noted supra, also gives 73
coastal states the authority to adopt national legislation to criminalize intentional or willful 
destruction of an underwater cable for a person under its jurisdiction.  Yet, as one commentator 
noted, “these provisions do not oblige States to take such measures, and many States do not have 
sufficient laws and regulations to protect cables from international damage within territorial 
waters, including the most basic measure of ensuring damage to submarine cables is 
criminalized.”    74
 One review of national legislation of Southeast Asian states found, for example, that there 
were no implementing provisions by any state expressly criminalizing intentional or negligent 
damage to underwater cables.   Further, even if states have adopted such measures under their 75
respective domestic legislation, the legislation may not have been updated since the 19th century.  
 UNCLOS, supra note 68, at art. 21. 73
 Tara Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity and International Law: An Intersectional Analysis, 74
24 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH 1, 57, 83 (Dec. 2015). 
 Robert Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables from Intentional Damage, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE 75
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 4, at 287 n. 37. 
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Thus, criminal penalties, even if they do exist, are outdated and do not incentivize coastal nations 
to enforce and prosecute alleged offenders.  
 Second, the international legal regime currently limits jurisdiction to flag states.  While 
this is not a problem unique to protection of underwater fiberoptic cables, it nonetheless is a 
limitation for protection of these critical communication lines.  UNCLOS limits jurisdiction to 
ships flying its flag or to flag state nationals who commit such acts.  There is allowance for a 
coastal nation to prosecute foreign offenders within its territorial waters for a limited subset of 
offenses that would include intentional damage to underwater fiberoptic cables; however, this is 
not the case for those offenders beyond the coastal nation’s territorial waters.   Thus, not only 76
are there gaps regarding criminalization of the offense, there are significant gaps in jurisdiction 
of potential offenders.   
 Third, while the 1884 Cable Convention provided for a right to board suspected vessels 
of engaging in nefarious acts against underwater cables, the later treaties, to include UNCLOS, 
do not provide for the same provisions.  Thus, it is unclear what right, if any, a nation has to 
board a suspected vessel outside of its territorial seas.  Under UNCLOS, if a vessel is engaged in 
nefarious activities within the territorial seas, then presumably the passage would not be innocent 
and, under Article 25, the coastal nation “may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to 
 See UNCLOS, supra note 68, at art. 27 (“The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be 76
exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any 
investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in 
the following cases: (a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; (b) if the crime is of a 
kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (c) if the assistance of the 
local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer 
of the flag State; or (d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances.”).
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prevent passage which is not innocent.”   The underwater fiberoptic cables, though, are more 77
susceptible to damage at great depths beyond a coastal nation’s territorial seas.  
 Lastly, while not entirely relevant to the discussion of underwater cables discussed in this 
paper, none of the provisions discussed supra apply to the cable landing stations on land.  The 
landing stations are nonetheless of strategic importance but as of yet lack any international law 
protections.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A WAY FORWARD 
 Several commentators have recommended ways forward to address these gaps.  Each 
recommendation will be briefly discussed in order to understand the thesis of this paper.  First, 
Tara Davenport has written several law review articles on the subject and is an editor of the 
foremost book on submarine cables, Submarine Cables: The Handbook of Law and Policy.  
Davenport recognizes that “the existing legal framework is fragmented and is not capable of 
ensuring the security of this vital communications infrastructure.”   Davenport recommends that 78
the international community come together to sign an international treaty specifically for the 
protection of the underwater fiberoptic cables.    79
 In her proposal, any treaty on underwater fiberoptic cables would a) define the range of 
offenses against cables, to include intentional damage and the introduction of malware; b) oblige 
the parties to enact domestic legislation criminalizing said offenses; c) extend jurisdiction to 
those acts committed within a state’s territory, committed by a national or from a ship flying its 
 Id. at art. 25. 77
 Davenport, supra note 74, at 82. 78
 Id. at 90. 79
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flag; d) oblige states to extend jurisdiction to an offender within its territory even if the offense 
took place outside of its territory; e) oblige states to take offenders within its territory into 
custody; and f) include provisions regarding extradition of individuals alleged to have committed 
offenses.   Davenport’s proposal would consolidate the myriad international laws under one 80
document, and place obligations on signatories to enact domestic legislation.  It would also 
ensure that if a nation will not prosecute offenders within its jurisdictional reach, then that nation 
must extradite the individual to a country that will do so.  
 Yoshinobu Takei, another prominent legal scholar in this area of the law, reviews the 
various jurisdictional arguments and argues that customary international law supports states 
extending universal jurisdiction to offenders who intentionally damage underwater cables.   81
Takei further recommends that three international treaties be revised to bring the international 
legal order up to date.  The treaties he discusses are a) the 1884 Cable Convention; b) existing 
treaties of the International Maritime Organization; and c) the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts (SUA) at Sea Convention.   Similar to Davenport, his proposal calls for the international 82
community to come together to form a consensus regarding underwater fiberoptic cables and 
enter into legally binding instruments to enhance their protection.   
 MP Sunak, noted supra, acknowledges that “the present piecemeal legal regime is 
deficient in ensuring the security of cables and such vital infrastructure requires a more 
 Id.80
 Yoshinobu Takei, Law and Policy for International Submarine Cables: An Asia-Pacific Perspective, 81
ASIAN J. I. L. 2, 228 (2012). 
 Id. at 228-229. 82
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comprehensive approach.”   He makes several international recommendations in addition to the 83
United Kingdom-specific proposals in his Policy Exchange piece.  First, he recommends coastal 
nations establish cable protection zones akin to New Zealand and Australia.   Second, he 84
recommends, similar to Davenport, for the United Kingdom to push for an international treaty 
specific to the protection of underwater fiberoptic cables.  85
 Lastly, Laurence Reza Wrathall makes several specific recommendations for the United 
States to take steps to protect the underwater fiberoptic cables.  First, Wrathall recommends that 
the United States ratify UNCLOS.   Second, he recommends that the United States adopt the 86
1988 SUA Protocol and Amendments and provide clarification as to whether intentional damage 
to underwater fiberoptic cables constitutes piracy.   Third, he recommends that the United States 87
establish a central monitoring point of contact within the federal government and, similar to MP 
Sunak, implement safety zones around underwater fiberoptic cables.   Finally, he recommends 88
that the United States issue declaratory statements regarding its views on protecting underwater 
fiberoptic cables.   89
 These commentators have several commonalities to them.  All recognize the existing 
gaps and all, in some way, are advocating for the international community to come together to 
 Sunak, supra note 44, at 35-36.83
 Id. at 35. See Carter & Burnett, supra note 5 (providing explanation of how cable protection zones 84
work in practice). 
 Id. at 36. 85
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 Id. at 249-250. 87
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achieve consensus on a way forward to protect these vital communication lines.  Yet, all of these 
approaches are, in some sense, merely illusory.  One only has to look to the international 
community’s struggles with combatting climate change as an example of how difficult achieving 
international consensus can be in modern day.  It took six years for the international community 
to agree on the Paris Agreement in 2015, only to have to wait three more years for implementing 
guidelines to be agreed upon in 2018.  Furthermore, the community initially began discussions in 
1989, almost 25 years prior to the international community coming together in Paris.  The 
international community lacks the political will to come together on these issues in a timely 
manner and, while some of these commentators acknowledge that truth, do not provide 
alternative solutions to these gaps.  If a nation wants to make significant change to the 
international legal regime, then what about a strategic plan to establish customary international 
law?   
IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. ELEMENTS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 The starting point for any discussion of customary international law is Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.  It describes the law that is applied at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), and, as such, is generally considered the most authoritative 
reference for sources of international law.  Article 38 lays out four types of international law that 
it can apply, one of which is relevant to this discussion.  It applies “international custom, as 
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evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”   There are thus two elements to customary 90
international law: (1) the general practice of states; and (2) opinio juris.  Opinio juris is defined 
as “the acceptance by states that such practice is necessary by rule of law.”   91
 In 2018, the ILC published conclusions on the identification of customary international 
law, noting that there must be a general practice, and acceptance of that practice as law (opinio 
juris).   It went further, noting that in reviewing whether these two elements exist, “regard must 92
be had to the overall context, the nature of the rule and the particular circumstances in which the 
evidence in question is to be found.”   This formula has often been considered to contain an 93
objective element (general practice) and a subjective element (the attitude toward that practice).  
The American Law Institute (ALI) Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (hereinafter “ALI Restatement”) overstates this principle and seemingly adds a third 
element to customary international law.  The ALI Restatement states that “customary 
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a 
sense of legal obligation (emphasis added).”   The Restatement’s use of the words “from a sense 94
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, Oct. 24, 1945 (The full text reads as follows: “The 90
Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to 
it, shall apply: international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law; the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; subject to the provisions of Article 59, 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”).
 LORI F. DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 61 (6th ed. 91
2014). 
 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on identification of customary international law, with 92
commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 124 (2018). 
 Id. at 126.  93
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of” implies a causation element between the two other elements.  For the purposes of this paper, 
however, customary international law will be looked at through the lens of Article 38.   
 (i) General Practice of States   
  Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law includes a non-exhaustive list of what 
constitutes custom.  The list includes the following: 
 diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions  
 of government legal advisors, official manuals of legal questions (e.g.,  
 manuals of military law), executive decisions and practices, orders to military  
 force (e.g., rules of engagement), comments by governments on ILC drafts and  
 accompanying commentary, legislation, international and national judicial  
 decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments (especially  
 when in ‘all states’ form), an extensive pattern of treaties in the same terms, 
 the practice of international organs and resolutions relating to legal questions 
 in UN organs, notably the General Assembly.    95
Similarly, the ILC lists as evidence of state practice “diplomatic acts and correspondence; 
conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an 
intergovernmental conference; conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct, including 
operational conduct ‘on the ground;’ legislative and administrative acts; and decisions of national 
courts.”    96
 The ALI Restatement notes that general practice “includes diplomatic acts and 
instructions as well as public measures and other government acts and official statements of 
policy, whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other states.”   Thus, 97
custom can be found in a variety of forms or, in the words of the ILC, a “wide range of forms…
 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. 2012). 95
 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 92, at 133.96
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. b (1986). 97
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[that includes] both physical and verbal acts.”   It is also important to note that these lists, while 98
non-exhaustive, are also not in any particular order.  The ILC states as much, noting that “there is 
no pre-determined hierarchy among the various forms.”   99
 There is also not a requirement that the practice occur over a significant period of time.  
In Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands, the 
ICJ stated that  
 although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, 
 a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis  
 of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement  
 would be that within the period in question, short though it may be, State practice,  
 including that of States whose interests are specifically affected, should have been 
 both extensive and virtually uniform.    100
The ILC notes that as long as the practice is general, by which it means “sufficiently widespread 
and representative, as well as consistent…no particular duration is required.”   The 101
commentary to the ALI Restatement reiterates this point, noting “the practice necessary to create 
customary international law may be of comparatively short duration, but…it must be ‘general 
and consistent.’”    102
 Indeed, in 1960, ICJ jurist Judge Kotaro Tanaka noted that the time element to establish 
customary international law may be entirely different in the modern age.  Judge Tanaka noted 
that “in former days, practice, repetition, and opinio juris sive necessitatis, which are the 
 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 92, at 133. 98
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ingredients of customary international law might be combined together in a very long and slow 
process extended over centuries…in the contemporary age of highly developed techniques of 
communication and information…[it] is greatly facilitated and accelerated.”   He envisaged a 103
nation being able to communicate directly with the rest of the world via an international 
organization such as the United Nations, and immediately knowing the respective countries’ 
reactions to the principle.  Thus, a new principle of customary international law could be 
established over a short period of time should the specially affected nations all adhere to it.  This 
will be illuminated infra when the paper analyzes the establishment of customary international 
law regarding the continental shelf. 
 Lastly, not every nation has to participate in the practice for it to be considered a general 
practice.  Brownlie’s reiterates that “complete uniformity of practice is not required, but 
substantial uniformity is” to establish a general practice.   The ILC notes “in assessing 104
generality, an indispensable factor to be taken into account is the extent to which those States 
that are particularly involved in the relevant activity or are most likely to be concerned with the 
alleged rule…have participated in the practice.”   The ALI Restatement notes that “it should 105
reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity.”   For 106
example, if there is a particular custom that is relevant to coastal states, a custom could be 
 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Africa; Liberia v. S. Africa), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 289 (July 18) 103
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considered general practice if coastal states practice it, even if landlocked states do not adhere to 
it as that custom would not be relevant to landlocked states. 
 (ii) Opinio juris  
 As noted supra, the second element is often referred to as a subjective element and, as 
such, it is often difficult to ascertain the reasoning behind a nation’s decisions.  The ICJ has a 
varied history with its methodology to determine if opinio juris exists in a given case.  Generally 
speaking, the court “will often infer the existence of opinio juris from a general practice, from 
scholarly consensus or from its own or other tribunals’ previous determinations.”   The ILC 107
notes that “the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or 
obligation.”   The ALI Restatement notes that “a practice that is generally followed but which 108
states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law.”    109
 Brownlie’s suggests a usage such as ceremonial salutes at sea would be something that is 
generally practiced by nations, but “which does not reflect a legal obligation.”   Nations may 110
freely choose not to obey such practices as they are practiced out of “courtesy (or ‘comity’) and 
are neither articulated nor claimed as legal requirements.”   Opinio juris exists only when that 111
practice is adhered to from a legal requirement.  The International Law Commission provides a 
non-exhaustive list of sources to find this element, including “public statements made on behalf 
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of States; official publications; government legal opinions; diplomatic correspondence; decisions 
of national courts; treaty provisions; and conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an 
international organization or at an intergovernmental conference.”   The ALI Restatement 112
concedes that the subjective element is not as straightforward, noting “it is often difficult to 
determine when that transformation into law has taken place.”  113
B. DOES CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW STILL EXIST?  
 The time element that Judge Tanaka mentions in the 1960 ICJ opinion discussed supra 
regarding customary international law highlights some of the most significant changes in its 
establishment over the past sixty years.  One commentator contends that the establishment of 
customary international law is, in reality, a faster and more efficient route to establishing 
international law than an international treaty.  He advocates that there are three primary reasons 
for its continuity vitality in the international field.  First, Michael Scharf argues that customary 
international law has “more jurisprudential power than does treaty law.”   Once customary 114
international law is established, it is binding on all states.  Treaties, on the other hand, are only 
binding on those States that are parties to it.   
 Second, Scharf notes that in practice, customary international law is actually faster than 
treaties.   For example, it took nearly ten years for UNCLOS to be written by the international 115
 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 92, at 140.112
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. c (1986). 113
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community; yet, as will be seen below, President Harry Truman established customary 
international law almost immediately with his proclamation on the continental shelf.  Third, 
treaty law is not as precise with its language because it is a result of the various parties’ 
compromises during negotiation.   Scharf argues that customary international law “may 116
provide greater precision since [it] evolve[s] in response to concrete situations and cases and are 
often articulated in written decisions of international courts.”   Thus, there are distinct 117
advantages for a nation to choose to establish customary international law as opposed to pushing 
the international community to establish a convention to draft a treaty.  This next section will 
analyze the establishment of customary international law regarding the continental shelf in the 
1940s.  
C. THE TRUMAN PROCLAMATION 
 One example of a nation establishing customary international law in a “radical departure” 
from what was previously thought of as international law was United States President Harry 
Truman’s proclamation regarding the resources on the continental shelf.   On September 28, 118
1945, President Truman declared that “the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the 
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as 
 Id. at 31. 116
 Id. at 31. 117
 Id. at 107.  See ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 18 (1981) 118
(discussing that this proclamation was formulated during the administration of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt such that the naming of it may not be entirely accurate).  
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appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.”   The United States 119
included a series of legal, economic, geological, conservation and national security arguments to 
justify its departure from international law.  These justifications could be universal for all coastal 
states.  For example, “self-protection compels the coastal state to keep close watch over activities 
off its shore which are of the nature and relative permanence necessary for utilization of 
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf.”   Any coastal state would agree 120
with this security assertion.   
 Similarly, this explanatory statement noted that “resources often form part of a pool or 
deposit extending seaward from within the state and their utilization may affect resources 
therein…[making it such that] the government of the country to whose shores the resources are 
contiguous is clearly the logical government to exercise jurisdiction and control over these 
resources.”   Thus, again, a coastal state seeing this justification could think to itself that a 121
similar policy would be advantageous to its own security, economic and geological aims.   
 The speed with which this proclamation was adopted by coastal states around the globe 
had as much to do with the universal justifications as it did to the growth of international 
organizations through which the policy could be distributed.  The proclamation “unleashed a 
series of claims throughout Latin America, [including] claims that often went well beyond the 
 Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667 (Sept. 28, 1945), 119
available at https://iea.uoregon.edu/treaty-text/1945-
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original US proclamation.”   The acceptance was so widespread that Professor Hersch 122
Lauterpacht, a noted ICJ jurist, remarked in 1950 that in considering “a radical change in pre-
existing international law, the length of time within which the customary rule of international law 
comes to fruition is irrelevant.”   There was a “degree of general acquiescence in what at first 123
appears to be a startling innovation.”    124
 Lauterpacht also noted that, when considering a creation of new international law by 
custom, “what matters is not so much the number of states participating in its creation and the 
length of the period within which that change takes place, as the relative importance, in any 
particular sphere, of [the] states inaugurating the change.”   With regard to the continental 125
shelf, the United States and Great Britain, the two great maritime powers at the time, were at the 
vanguard of the change.  The stature of these two counties greatly enhanced the credibility of this 
innovative claim.  This was the case despite the United Kingdom’s initial reluctance to join in the 
Truman Proclamation, as will be discussed infra. 
 Thirteen years after the Truman Proclamation, the world came together at the 1958 
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, as discussed supra.  The conference essentially 
codified the United States viewpoint on the continental shelf as customary international law.  As 
one commentator noted, the convention “amounted to a formal international affirmation of the 
Truman Proclamation.”   This particular example is one of a paramount importance in any 126
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discussion of establishing innovative customary international law in the maritime domain.  It 
provides a good framework for the United States to follow in terms of establishing customary 
international law to protect its underwater fiberoptic cables.  The next section of this paper will 
lay out several steps for the United States to do so.  
V. APPLICATION TO UNDERWATER FIBEROPTIC CABLES 
A. STRATEGIC PLAN TO ESTABLISH CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 The sections supra highlight that there are several gaps in the international legal 
framework protecting underwater fiberoptic cables.  One in particular is of paramount 
importance - the ability to protect cables from intentional damage as a result of nefarious actors 
beyond a coastal nation’s territorial seas.  One method of radical change that the United States 
should consider would be prosecution of alleged offenders for intentional damage, which would 
include the ability for its Coast Guard, and its Navy, for that matter, to be able to stop and board 
vessels suspected of planning or committing such offenses beyond the territorial seas.  If the 
United States wanted to initiate such a radical change to the regime, then there are several steps it 
should take to do so. 
 First, Congress needs to enact updated domestic legislation that criminalizes the 
intentional damage of underwater fiberoptic cables.  That legislation needs modern-day penalties 
that will make it economically worthwhile for the Coast Guard, Navy and Department of Justice 
to investigate, arrest and prosecute offenders.  In addition, the legislation needs explicit language 
that it applies extra-territorially to offenses that may have, or have had, an impact on the United 
States.  If a underwater fiberoptic cable is cut in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, then the 
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impact in the United States, and the other country where the cable lands, for that matter, is the 
same as if the cable was cut in the territorial seas of the United States - access is shut off, or re-
routed (and delayed), in both scenarios.  The concept of protective jurisdiction will be expounded 
upon infra, but the important point is that the domestic legislation needs to be both updated and 
explicit with regard to its reach. 
 Second, similar to the Truman Proclamation, the United States needs to issue a 
proclamation declaring its intentions.  This proclamation should come from the President of the 
United States, and also include transparent legal, security, and diplomatic reasoning behind its 
decision.  This will be expounded upon infra, but the emphasis in this step is that the 
announcement should come from the highest office of government.  The United States needs to 
be explicit with its intentions and ensure that the entire world is clearly put on notice.  
 This proclamation, however, should not simply be done in a vacuum.  Rather, the United 
States needs to engage other allies that are specially affected by underwater fiberoptic cables.  
For example, Australia and New Zealand, already at the forefront with cable protection zones, 
would be ideal countries to issue simultaneous intentions regarding protection of underwater 
cables beyond their respective territorial waters.  The United Kingdom would be another country 
that is specially affected and would have similar reasoning in wanting to protect its territory from 
the impact of intentional damage to the underwater fiberoptic cables connecting it to the rest of 
the world.  Canada and Japan may be two other countries that the United States would want to 
engage in issuing simultaneous declarations.  It could help if an international organization like 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joined in the simultaneous proclamation.  As 
Lauterpacht noted in 1950, the importance of the countries initiating the change is paramount.  
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Thus, having significant allies in America’s corner, as well as an international organization like 
NATO, would mean that the proclamation carries greater weight and would potentially be more 
strongly indicative of international law.   
 Third, the United States should plan additional diplomatic statements at international 
events to expound on its reasoning.  For example, the Ambassador to the United Nations could 
issue a diplomatic statement at the annual General Assembly meeting in September.  Other 
Cabinet members, like the Secretary of State, Homeland Security Secretary and the Secretary of 
Defense, could provide similar speeches in both domestic and international fora.  The Legal 
Advisor to the Department of State should give a speech laying out the legal justification for this 
new approach and create a formal memorandum to that effect.   
 Fourth, again similar to the Truman Proclamation, the United States needs to clearly 
articulate its legal justification for such a radical departure from previous international legal 
standards.  While this is looped into both the second and third steps, it is carved out separately as 
a fourth step to underscore the impact that transparent reasoning is necessary to the establishment 
of customary international law in this context.  The justification would begin with the national 
security threat of the underwater fiberoptic cables, and the impact that loss of connectivity would 
bring to the nation’s economy and the broader global economy.  Since the underwater fiberoptic 
cables provide such connectivity to the United States and, further, since the cables land on the 
United States, it makes the most sense for the United States to exert its jurisdiction to protect 
those cables regardless of their location in the worlds’ oceans.  This applies to the nation on the 
other end of the cable as well, as the responsibility for protection of the respective underwater 
cable should be shared between them.   
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 In light of the detrimental impact that interference with an underwater fiberoptic cable 
would produce on American soil, the United States would be justified in exerting jurisdiction 
using the protective principle.  The ALI Restatement notes that “a state has jurisdiction to 
prescribe law with respect to…certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals 
that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state 
interests.”   This so-called “protective principle” has been assumed by “nearly all states…over 127
aliens for acts done abroad which affect the internal or eternal security or other key interests of 
the state.”   Therefore, there is precedent for exerting it in other similarly situated scenarios.   128
 This principle, however, is not without limitation.  Rather, a nation’s exercise of 
protective jurisdiction must be reasonable.   The ALI Restatement lays out several factors to 129
consider in determining reasonableness, including “the link of the activity to the territory of the 
regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity…has substantial, direct and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory.”   Other factors include the following:  130
 the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to  
 the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities  
 and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally  
 accepted; the importance of the regulation to the international, political,  
 legal or economic system; the extent to which the regulation is consistent  
 with the traditions of the international system; the extent to which another  
 state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and the likelihood of  
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1986).  127
 CRAWFORD, supra note 95, at 462. 128
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1986) (“Even when one of the bases 129
for jurisdiction under Section 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with 




 conflict with regulation by another state.  131
 The United States would have to clearly articulate its security interests in protecting these 
underwater fiberoptic cables extra-territorially.  This is especially important because of the 
likelihood that this legislation will be in conflict with regulations of the flag state of either the 
vessel or the nationality of the individuals accused of intentionally damaging the underwater 
cables.   In the case of underwater fiberoptic cables, simultaneous damage to the cables would 132
cause catastrophic impact to America’s economy and national security, wreaking potential havoc 
on nearly every aspect of American citizens’ daily lives.  Given the importance of the cables to 
the financial, political, diplomatic and national security interests of the United States and the 
ongoing issues with lax flag state enforcement, it is likely that exercising protective jurisdiction 
in this regard would be widely accepted by other coastal nations specially affected by such 
nefarious activity.  
 Lastly, the United States should enter into bi-lateral agreements with the countries at the 
opposite ends of the underwater fiberoptic cables that have landing stations on American soil.  
For example, transatlantic cables that land in Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, France and 
Spain would all necessitate bilateral agreements between the United States and the respective 
landing station country on the opposite end of the cable.  These agreements should provide for 
protection of the cable beyond the countries’ respective territorial seas.  They should require both 
countries’ navies to patrol the world’s oceans to protect their respective underwater cables.  
 Id. 131
 See Takei, supra note 81 (discussing application of universal jurisdiction to offenders of damage to 132
underwater fiberoptic cables akin to an act of piracy). 
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Further, they should provide for bilateral support in apprehension, evidence collection and 
prosecution of alleged offenders. 
 In completing these steps the United States would be establishing both state practice and 
the opinio juris necessary to establish customary international law.  Numerous coastal states 
would be issuing similar proclamations and, once the justification is widely distributed across the 
globe, other nations will, similar to the Truman Proclamation, recognize their own security 
interests in protecting the underwater fiberoptic cables that land on their respective territory.  
Again, it is not necessary that all states issue similar proclamations; only that specially affected 
states engage in a consistent practice.  The legal memorandum, as well as additional speeches 
done by legal advisors, would have the effect of clearly articulating that the declaration stems 
from a sense of legal obligation.   
 There is even the potential that American adversaries could see the advantage to 
establishing customary international law in this area.  After all, any interference with an 
underwater fiberoptic cable has the potential to impact the respective countries’ ability to utilize 
the vital communication lines.  For example, if several underwater fiberoptic cables are cut, then 
that traffic could be re-routed to other fiberoptic cables, which may cause delay to more users, 
including the nefarious actor’s traffic.  As more countries agree to the common principle, there 
will be more of a collective will to come together to codify the principles in a treaty.   
B. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS APPROACH 
 There are several obstacles that stand in the way of this approach.  First, and most 
obvious, is that it relies on other allies to share America’s concerns with underwater fiberoptic 
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cables and agree to issue similar proclamations simultaneously.  There is no assurance that other 
nations - even our allies - will agree to a radical departure of this nature.  Indeed, even with the 
Truman Proclamation, neither Canada nor the United Kingdom wanted any part in issuing 
similar proclamations.  The United Kingdom announced that “His Majesty’s Government do[es] 
not wish to be associated with this Decision [regarding the Continental Shelf] and would prefer 
that, when it is announced, no reference should be made to prior consultation with His Majesty’s 
Government.”   Similarly, Hollick noted that “it was clear that the Canadian government saw 133
no reason to join with the United States in unilateral policy that was unnecessary and that 
moreover would have a negative impact on relations with other countries.”   Thus, even with 134
sound legal justification, it is not guaranteed that other nations will initially agree to a radical 
change such as the one proposed here regarding protection of underwater cables just as occurred 
over the continental shelf. 
 This goes to the whole premise that customary international law even provides a solution 
to the gaps in the international legal framework.  If other countries or international organizations 
do not agree with the radical departure from the current regime, then there is not the requisite 
ingredients for the establishment of customary international law as there is no evidence of a 
general state practice.  In addition, if several states countered this proclamation, it is not clear 
whether customary international law would be established despite these persistent objectors.  
Thus, bringing the world together at a convention to negotiate differences may be the most 
feasible way to achieve change in this realm.     
 HOLLICK, supra note 118, at 59 (quoting Letter from the second secretary of the British embassy 133
(Cecil) to Mr. William Bishop, assistant to the legal advisor (Hackworth), August 31, 1945, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 1945, II, 1527.). 
 Id. at 60. 134
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 Second, while the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, the unilateral change it is 
advocating for regarding boarding vessels suspected of engaging in intentional damage to 
underwater fiberoptic cables runs directly counter to the boarding provisions in UNCLOS.  
UNCLOS provides for justification for boarding a non-warship on the high seas if several factors 
are met, none of which is suspicion of intentional damage of a submarine cable.  For example, if 
a ship is engaged in piracy, the slave trade or is flying without nationality, then UNCLOS allows 
for a warship to board said vessel.   In addition, UNCLOS explicitly states that “every State 135
shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters over ships flying its flag.”   Thus, in advancing the position that the United States could 136
not just board a vessel suspected of intentional damage to cables but also potentially prosecute 
said individuals in domestic courts would be in stark contrast to the terms of UNCLOS.  
 Lastly, there are difficulties with the reach of the jurisdictional claims of the United 
States.  The underwater fiberoptic cables are not, for the most part, owned by governments.  
Whereas the continental shelf and the resources on it belonged to the respective coastal states, 
the underwater cables are owned by private, multi-national companies.   While the cables have 137
been deemed “critical infrastructure” by the United States government, the underwater cables 
themselves are the property of these multi-national companies.   These companies have 138
agreements, called “Construction and Maintenance Agreements,” that specify certain provisions, 
 UNCLOS, supra note 68, at art. 110. 135
 Id. at art. 94. 136
 See Mick Green, The Submarine Industry: How Does it Work? in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE 137
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 4. (discussing how the cable industry works).
 Working Group 8 Submarine Cable Routing & Landing, Final Report - Protection of Submarine 138
Cables Through Spatial Separation, supra note 28 at 11. 
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including responsibilities that include “monitoring shipping activities close to the cable[s].”   139
Thus, in order for this strategy to work, the United States would potentially need agreement from 
the multi-national companies that own the fiberoptic cables.  
C. REASONS WHY IT MAY STILL BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD 
 Despite the potential obstacles to this approach, the process of establishing customary 
international law may be the best possible avenue for the United States to make change in this 
area of international law.  First, the justifications for protecting underwater fiberoptic cables are 
universal.  Every state would find commonality in their desire to maintain connectivity via 
underwater fiberoptic cables.  As this paper has illustrated, the underwater fiberoptic cables are 
vital to not just national economies, but the entire global economy as well.  Therefore, similar to 
the Truman Proclamation, once the United States issues the declaration along with its 
justification, it would not be surprising if other coastal nations express similar declarations 
regardless of whether these countries initially chose to issue simultaneous declarations. 
 Second, while UNCLOS does contain explicit provisions regarding boarding of a vessel, 
that same article begins with “except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by 
treaty.”   As noted supra, the 1884 Cable Convention is still considered valid international law.  140
The United States can legitimately look to the provisions regarding boarding in Article X.  It can 
also argue that there was pre-existing law for this principle.  Indeed, Cyrus Field, noted supra, 
 Green, supra note 123 at 49.  These companies also maintain complex security mechanisms by which 139
they can immediately discover damage to a fiberoptic cable via sensor monitoring vice physical 
monitoring.  There are risks that malicious actors could access these complex systems and cause 
irreparable harm via a cyber attack; however, this is not the subject of this paper.   
 UNCLOS, supra note 68, at art. 110. 140
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recognized the vital importance of underwater cables in the 19th century.  Thus, it is not 
necessarily the case that this position would be contrary to UNCLOS.  Similarly, there was no 
limitation on nationality of the offender in the 1884 Cable Convention.  UNCLOS, at Article 92, 
provides a similar exception for exclusive jurisdiction to flag state “save in exceptional cases 
expressly provided for in international treaties.”   Thus, there is precedent in the 1884 Cable 141
Convention for the United States to establish jurisdiction over foreign offenders beyond 
territorial waters.  In addition, as one commentator noted, “Article 113 [of UNCLOS] only 
concerns the obligations of states that can establish national jurisdiction over an alleged offender, 
and does not make clear which other states may also exercise penal jurisdiction over the breaking 
or damage of submarine cables beyond the territorial seas.”   Thus, international law is not 142
clear on the criminalization of offenders beyond the territorial seas.  The United States and its 
allies could clear up any confusion with its declarations.   
 Lastly, while it is true that the cables are owned and operated by private multi-national 
companies, the United States would not be doing anything to the actual underwater fiberoptic 
cables.  The United States Coast Guard and United States Navy would simply be patrolling the 
areas where the underwater fiberoptic cables are located, and would not be in any physical or 
other contact with the cables.  There would be no intention by the United States government to 
engage the actual underwater fiberoptic cable that would in any way cause damage to it.  Rather, 
the entire intention of the United States government would be protection of those underwater 
fiberoptic cables, which would, in turn, save those companies potentially billions of dollars in 
 Id. at art. 92. 141
 Takei, supra note 81, at 217. 142
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repair costs.  Thus, while it would be prudent for the United States to engage these multi-national 
companies so that they understand the rationale behind the declaration, there would not be a need 
for a public-private partnership agreement.  In fact, these companies would most likely prefer for 
governments to protect the underwater cables from intentional damage so that they do not have 
to expend millions of dollars to repair them.   
 Therefore, the United States should strongly consider the advancement of this area of 
international law through the establishment of customary international law.  In doing so, the 
United States would advance the area of the law more quickly than through treaty formation and, 
further, clearly establish the parameters of the international law protecting underwater fiberoptic 
cables with explicit language rather than the language of ambiguous compromise that often 
results from international treaties.  This approach would be a radical departure from prior 
international law; however, the importance of these underwater fiberoptic cables is 
unprecedented in our world’s history.  Never before has a set of extra-territorial infrastructure 
played such a critical role in United States (and global) affairs.  Thus, an unprecedented scenario 
requires an unprecedented solution.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The world today is connected by a series of underwater fiberoptic cables that traverse the 
globe’s surface.  While the underwater fiberoptic cable in 2019 has transformed in capacity and 
effectiveness since the first underwater cable was laid in 1850, the international legal regime has 
not experienced a similar transformation.  The international legal regime remains where it was 
during the mid-20th century, when telephone calls and telegraphs connected the world’s 
 !42
continents.  Needless to say, there are significant gaps in the international legal regime.  This 
paper looks at the gaps and reviews the proposed solutions that international scholars present in 
various fora.  Those solutions all contemplate some form of international collaboration to form a 
specific treaty bringing together the various pieces of international law into one document to 
shore up any gaps in existing law.  While the recommendations are commendable, this paper 
looks at customary international law and argues that the United States should establish a strategic 
framework to establish customary international law to protect underwater fiberoptic cables.  
Unilateral action, or action taken with a series of allies or international organizations, especially 
when done with universal justification, may shake the international community from its deadlock 
and establish customary international law.  Clear precedent exists in the rapid adoption of the 
United States unilateral proclamation of rights in its continental shelf in 1945 as good 
international law in less than a decade.  In doing so, the United States may find itself on a more 
efficient path toward protecting itself from nefarious actors looking to wreak havoc on its 
territory by simultaneously damaging multiple underwater fiberoptic cables in areas beyond its 
territorial seas.   
   
  
     
 
 !43
